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Abstract 
 
The 1990s witnessed a worldwide trend toward electricity sector reforms in developed 
and developing economies. These reforms have generally been based on private 
participation, regulatory reform, and competition in the sector. This paper reviews and 
draws lessons from the reform experience in developing countries. Developing countries 
have had to reform technically and financially less efficient electricity systems with less 
developed private sectors, weak economic and political institutions, shortage of skilled 
human resources, and lack of regulatory experience. The paper argues that competition 
and regulatory reform are equally important to the success of reforms. Also, the sector’s 
systemic characteristics and the country’s institutional endowment should weight 
equally in the design of reforms. In addition, distributional and access to service aspects 
of reforms call for a redefined state involvement rather than a complete withdrawal from 
the sector. 
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REFORM AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTRICITY SECTORS 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
Tooraj Jamasb1 
Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
During the past two decades, many developed, transition, and developing countries have 
embarked on electricity sector reforms (APEC, 2000). These reforms have taken place 
within the backdrop of a wider paradigm shift from state ownership and centralised 
organisation of infrastructure industries to private ownership, public regulation, and 
market-oriented structures (OECD, 2000). The recent trend towards electricity sector 
reforms is not due to breakthroughs in economic theory. Rather, it reflects a general 
dissatisfaction with the performance of traditional organization and regulation of the 
industry and the desire to improve the efficiency of the sector. Also, reforms by 
pioneering countries and technological progress have contributed to adoption of reforms 
in other countries. 
 
The driving forces behind the electricity sector reforms in developed and developing 
countries have been different. In developed countries, the main aim of the reforms has 
been to improve the performance of relatively efficient systems. In developing and 
transition countries, the burden of price subsidies, low service quality, low collection 
rates, high network losses, and poor service coverage have meant that many 
governments are no longer willing or able to support the existing arrangements 
(Newbery, 2002; Joskow, 1998). In addition, international development agencies have 
engaged in promotion and implementation of electricity sector reforms. This paper 
                                                          
1
 This paper is indebted to generous contribution of ideas and valuable comments from Paul 
Joskow, Yannis Kessides, David Newbery, Takis Papapanagiotou, Michael Pollitt, Mary 
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reviews the experience with electricity sector reforms in developing countries to date 
and draws some lessons for reforms and regulatory design. 
 
The reforms have sought to transform the state-owned and centralized electricity sectors 
into decentralized, market-oriented industries with private sector participation, 
competition in generation and supply businesses, and regulation of natural monopoly 
activities. In order for the decentralized industry to function, the reform and regulatory 
design must establish appropriate structural, institutional, and operational framework. 
The main steps of a stylised reform are to (i) restructure the sector, (ii) establish 
regulatory authorities, (iii) organise markets for generation, (iv) regulate transmission 
and distribution networks, (v) privatize existing assets and promote new investments, 
and (vi) allow for cost-reflective electricity tariffs (Newbery, 2002; Joskow, 1998). 
 
Electricity sector reforms in developing countries have taken place within diverse 
political, economic, and structural contexts. In addition, many reforms were initiated at 
a time when the international experience with such initiatives was limited. 
Consequently, the reforms have taken a variety of forms and followed different paths 
(Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001; Millan et al., 2001). Within this background, it is 
perhaps not surprising that many reforms have encountered unexpected problems and 
the degree to which they have achieved their goals varies across the countries (Fischer 
and Serra, 2000). 
 
The international experience with electricity sector reform in developing countries has 
shown that achieving workable reforms is considerably more complicated than 
anticipated. Electricity systems in developing countries vary considerably with regard to 
size, structure, and resource mix. In addition, many of these countries are constrained by 
institutional endowment of their political and economic systems and lack of human 
resources with regulatory skills and experience (Stern, 2000). 
 
It is generally recognized that regulatory design and implementation strategy should 
take the specific characteristics of the sector in question into consideration. However, 
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the reform models adopted have not always fitted the sectors of these countries and 
many reforms have encountered unexpected problems and unintended outcomes. The 
experience has shown that regulatory design is crucial to success and failure of reforms 
(IADB, 2001a). Successful reforms can improve the efficiency of the sector and offer 
lower prices, and better quality of service. At the same time, flawed regulatory design 
can undermine the benefits of reforms. 
 
Section 2 of this paper reviews private participation in the electricity sectors of 
developing countries during the 1990s. Section 3 focuses on aspects of reforms in 
countries with considerable private investments. Section 4 discusses the reform in a few 
selected countries in more detail. Section 5 discusses some important reform issues in 
developing countries. Section 6 is conclusion. 
 
 
2. Private Sector Participation in Electricity Sectors of Developing Countries 
 
Private sector participation is arguably the most important element of electricity sector 
reforms. For many reforming countries faced with increasing burden of capital 
requirements for expansion of publicly owned electricity systems, private participation 
is an alternative source for securing the much-needed investments in the sector. In 
addition, to the extent that the required public expenditures are financed through 
taxation, the marginal cost of public funding in terms of the associated dead-weight loss 
constitutes an added social welfare loss. In developing countries, the magnitude of such 
losses can be significantly higher than 1. For example, the dead-weight loss in Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand have been estimated at 1.2, 2.5, and 1.2-1.5 respectively 
(Beato and Laffont, 2002; World Bank, 1997). 
 
Private ownership together with competition (and incentive-regulated networks) is 
expected to result in cost efficiency, lower prices, reduced system losses, and improved 
revenue collection (Newbery, 2002). The gains from the reforms are expected to exceed 
the higher transaction costs from breaking up vertically integrated systems, higher risk 
premiums required by private investors, and cost of regulation. 
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In addition, privatization of existing assets offers the prospects of significant proceeds 
for cash-strapped governments with foreign debts. The success of market-oriented 
reforms is, therefore, highly dependent on participation and functioning of private actors 
in the sector. 
 
The 1990s witnessed a marked move towards reforming the electricity sectors in many 
developing countries. Between 1990 and 1999, private participation took place in the 
electricity sectors of over 75 developing countries. During this period, total private 
investments in these countries amounted to approximately US$160.7 billion. Divestiture 
of existing assets and greenfield projects stand for 50% and 45% of total private 
investments respectively with the balance committed under operations and management 
arrangements (Figure 1). The number of projects associated with the investments 
amounted to 695 in total and showed a similar distribution across the types of activities 
(Figure 2). 
 
The distribution of private investments in electricity sectors across different activity 
areas and regions of the world has been rather uneven. Figures 3 and 4 show that more 
than two-thirds of total investments and projects in the sector between 1990 and 1999 
have been in pure generation facilities. At the same time, distribution-only and vertically 
integrated utilities investments have attracted approximately 16% and 10% of total 
investments respectively. In contrast, transmission-only activities accounted for only 1% 
of the investments in the sector. 
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Figure 1: Private investments by type (1990-99) 
Source: World Bank PPI Project Database 
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Figure 2: Number of projects with private participation by type (1990-99) 
Source: World Bank PPI Project Database 
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Figure 4: Share of investments with private participation by industry segment (1990-99) 
Source: World Bank PPI Project Database 
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Figure 5: Share of number of projects with private participation by segment (1990-99) 
Source: World Bank PPI Project Database 
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The investment patterns reveal notable differences among the main regions of the world. 
As shown in Figure 5, the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) and East Asian and 
Pacific (EAP) countries accounted for 40% and 35% of total private investments. An 
additional 12% of investments took place in South Asian (SA) countries. The remaining 
13% of private investments has taken place in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Africa. 
 
Figure 5 also exhibits notable differences in the types of investments undertaken across 
the regions of the world. Approximately, 80% of the private investments in LAC and 
ECA countries have been in divestiture projects. In contrast, 80% of the investments in 
EAP and SA countries have taken place in greenfield projects. The considerably lower 
investments in MENA and African countries reflect lower levels of reform-related 
activities in these regions. 
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Figure 5: Private investment in electricity projects by region. 
Source: Source: World Bank PPI Project Database 
 
The apparent regional differences in investment patterns reflect the differences in the 
reform strategies adopted by the countries in these regions during the 1990s. By and 
large, the EAP and SA countries opted for power purchase agreements (PPAs) with 
independent power producers (IPPs) while maintaining state-ownership of existing 
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assets. In contrast, governments in the LAC adopted a more balanced approached by 
opening the sector for IPPs and privatization. 
 
Investments in different regions also exhibit variations across different areas of activity 
of the sector. Figure 6 shows that, in all regions, the percentage share of private 
investments in generation-only type of facilities has been higher than in other types of 
activities. In addition, integrated activities that include generation have attracted a 
considerable share of investments. The pattern corresponds with the anticipated strong 
growth in demand for electricity in most developing countries. LAC countries exhibit 
the highest level of investments in distribution-only and transmission systems. At the 
same time, there is a notable absence of distribution-only investments in SA and MENA 
countries. In contrast, the largest portion of private investments in MENA countries has 
been in integrated utilities. 
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Figure 6: Private participation by segment and region 
Source: World Bank PPI Project Database 
 
Distribution of private sector participation during the 1990s has been rather uneven. 
Figure 7 and Table 1 reveal a clear divide between pre-1997 and post-1997 private 
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investments in the sector. From the beginning of the 1990s to 1997, electricity sector 
reforms and anticipated economic growth resulted in an increasing level of private 
investments in the sector. In the post-1997 period, however, financial problems in many 
countries in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe have led to a sharp decline in 
investments in these regions. 
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Figure 7:Investments and number of projects with private participation (1990-99) 
Source: World Bank PPI Project Database 
 
Table 1: Private investments in electricity projects in LDCs 1990-99 (1998 $ millions) 
Source: World Bank PPI Database 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
49 0 27 1 84 42 1,014 503 709 455 2,884 
East Asia & the 
Pacific 
55 454 4,622 5,592 7,291 7,492 11,677 12,437 4,833 1,945 56,398 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
85 0 1,041 0 1,332 3,369 3,507 2,128 504 688 12,655 
Latin America 
& the Caribbean 
1,204 23 2,497 3,298 2,924 5,788 8,750 20,629 12,720 6,287 64,120 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
0 0 0 0 225 0 217 4,679 0 715 5,837 
South 
Asia 
169 735 37 1,186 3,081 3,193 4,934 2,319 926 2,227 18,805 
Total 1,562 1,212 8,225 10,077 14,936 19,884 30,100 42,694 19,692 12,317 160,698 
 
Figure 7 reflects the sensitivity of private investments to changes in economic climate 
and in particular currency fluctuations such as those experienced in Asia and Latin 
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America. Indeed, the extent of decline in private investments is likely to be more 
profound than those indicated in the table. As a result of economic downturn and 
revised estimates of demand growth in some reforming countries, many private 
investments committed in the pre-1997 period were, in particular PPAs with IPPs in 
South and East Asia, subject to renegotiations and some projects may not be 
materialized (see e.g. World Bank, 1998b). 
 
It is difficult to predict the effect of the apparent decline in investments that may persist 
in the long run. A major concern is that the decline is occurring at a time when many 
developing countries are in various stages of reforming their electricity sectors. Some 
countries may increase their reform efforts to increase the attractiveness of their sectors 
to private investors. However, it is likely that some countries will, due to their economic 
conditions, face a lack of interest by investors. More recently, the financial crisis in 
Argentina and abolition of dollar-based electricity tariffs charged by privatized utilities 
owned by foreign firms has demonstrated the potential risks to private investors. The 
recent economic and sector level problems in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela are 
likely to have a lasting effect in private investments in other Latin American countries. 
 
A decline in private investments means that governments in many reforming countries 
will have to maintain an active presence in the electricity sector. There is a lack of data 
on public sector investments in electricity sectors of developing countries. According to 
estimates reported in Fay (2001) the average investment needs of the electricity sectors 
in Latin America for the 2000-05 period are about $24 billion per year. In comparison, 
between 1990 and 1999, total investment in greenfield electricity projects in the region 
was approximately $ 16 billion. 
 
The main purpose of attracting private participation has been to relieve governments 
from the burden of investment in the sector. However, in many cases such as in Asia, 
provision of contractual safeguards awarded to foreign investors in the form of 
government guarantees, take-or-pay assurances, and fuel and currency clauses, PPAs 
have in effect become foreign debt assumed by governments (see e.g. World Bank, 
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1998a). Macroeconomic instability and subsequent currency devaluations reduce the 
value of earnings of foreign investors. Also, currency devaluation reduces the dollar 
value of the potential proceeds from asset divestiture, which in turn can reduce the 
incentive among governments to privatize these. 
 
 
3. Reform in Developing Countries 
 
As mentioned previously, a central aim of electricity sector reforms in developing 
countries is to attract private sector investments. As private participation is an important 
indicator of reform-related activities, this section focuses on the main aspects of reforms 
in countries where there have been considerable private participation during the 1990s.  
 
Table 2 shows the top 12 as well as 8 other developing countries with considerable 
private participation in the sector. The top 12 and the whole group of 20 countries in the 
table account for approximately 83% and 95% of the worldwide private investments 
($US 161 billion) in the 1990s respectively. 
 
Table 2: Countries with highest private investments in the 
electricity sector 1990-1999 (1998 $US million) 
Source: World Bank PPI Database 
1 Brazil 31,627 11 Malaysia 5,970 
2 China 19,049 12 Morocco 4,820 
3 Argentina 14,986 13 Korea 4,522 
4 Philippines 11,672 14 Turkey 3,710 
5 Indonesia 9,580 15 Peru 3,680 
6 India 8,881 16 Hungary 2,446 
7 Chile 6,836 17 Russia 2,070 
8 Pakistan 6,693 18 Kazakhstan 1,508 
9 Colombia 6,512 19 Czech Republic 1,300 
10 Thailand 6,413 20 Guatemala 1,296 
 
Figure 8 shows the divide in types of private investments in the top 10 countries. Latin 
American countries in general and Brazil and Argentina in particular have attracted 
more investments to divestiture of existing assets. In Asia, due to low level of 
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privatization activities, most private investment has taken place in greenfield projects 
such as IPPs. 
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Figure 8: Countries with most private investments 1990-99 (1998-$US million) 
Source: World Bank PPI Project Database 
 
 
3.1 Competition and Market Power 
 
Electricity supply industry is no longer viewed as a vertically integrated natural 
monopoly activity. Rather, the industry is regarded separate as separate but inter-related 
activities with distinctive economic characteristics. The new view of the electricity 
sector is that the generation and supply activities are potentially competitive while the 
transmission and distribution activities can, exhibiting natural monopoly characteristics, 
be subject to incentive-based regulation. 
 
The main focus of electricity sector reforms has been on liberalization of electricity 
generation. However, many reforming countries have experienced difficulties in 
enforcing effective competition in this market. It has now become evident that 
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regulatory design is crucial for achieving effective competition in the sector. Lack of 
competition results in market power to existing actors that (i) reduces pressure on cost-
saving efforts, (ii) limits consumer choice, (iii) distorts investments in new generation 
capacity, and (iv) prevents new entries. 
 
Several conditions can lead to lack of real competition and market power. First, in the 
restructuring phase, the reform must ensure that existing generation resources are split 
into a sufficient number of potentially competitive units. The main issues here are to 
avoid establishment of dominant firms and ensure a balanced resource mix among the 
competing firms while taking the size of the sector into account. In the UK, the problem 
of market power became apparent shortly after the reform. It was only after a lengthy 
process of new entries by IPPs and forced divestiture of generation capacity by the 
incumbents that a more competitive market was achieved (Newbery, 1999). 
 
Despite its obvious benefits, creating sufficient number of generation firms has not been 
easy. At the same time, in most reforming countries, energy companies have shown a 
strong tendency toward vertical integration and dominant position in the market. 
Complex ownership structures among large international energy companies and lack of 
experience on the part of regulators have also resulted in horizontal re-integration of the 
sector. Table 3 shows the market share of the three largest generating firms in a number 
of reforming countries. As shown in the table, there is a high level of concentration in 
generation in most countries. In order to limit market power, some regulators have 
adopted measures such as setting limits on market share of generators. In Argentina, the 
maximum size of the generators has been limited to 10% of the market. 
 
Second, vertical integration of generation firms with transmission and distribution 
utilities can create incentives for discrimination among the generation firms for gaining 
access to grid. Most countries have imposed limitations on cross ownership between 
generation and transmission utilities. As shown in Table 3, many countries have 
introduced “regulated” rather than “negotiated” third-party-access arrangements. 
However, in some countries, limitations on cross ownership in generation and 
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distribution has been less stringent. In Chile, since the introduction of reform, partly due 
to ownership of the main transmission grid by the largest generation firm and negotiated 
access arrangements, there has not been significant new entry into the market. 
 
Table 3: Share of the three largest firms and network access arrangements in 
selected countries 
 Share of Three Largest Firms  
in the Sector (%) 
Network Access 
Arrangement 
 Generation Transmission Distribution Transmission Distribution 
Argentina 30 80 50 RTPA rTPA 
Brazil 40 60 40  RTPA rTPA 
Chile 67 100 50 NTPA nTPA 
Colombia 50 100 60 RTPA rTPA 
Peru  100 100 100 RTPA rTPA 
Bolivia 70 100 70 RTPA rTPA 
El Salvador 83 100 88 RTPA rTPA 
Panama 82 100 100 RTPA rTPA 
Hungary 74 100 65 SB SB 
Poland 45 100 21 NTPA nTPA 
Czech republic 71 100 49 NTPA rTPA 
Pakistan 95 100 100 SB SB 
Thailand 100 100 100 SB SB 
Malaysia 62 100 97 SB SB 
Indonesia 100 100 100 SB SB 
SB: Single-buyer     nTPA: negotiated third-party-access     rTPA: regulated third-party-access 
 
Third, rules concerning allocation of common transmission costs, congestion pricing, 
and arrangements for financing investments for expansion of grid system can affect 
competition in the sector. The main issue in allocation of common costs is to develop an 
appropriate and workable procedure for calculating operating, maintenance, and capital 
costs. For example, allocation of costs is complicated by existence of economies of 
scale in transmission activities. 
 
Most Latin American countries have adopted two-part transmission tariff systems where 
a fixed payment is added to the system marginal income. Another issue is how the 
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transmission cost should be distributed among the users of the network. In Chile and 
Argentina, transmission costs are covered by the generation companies, while in Bolivia 
and Colombia, costs are split equally among the generation companies and consumers. 
 
Another issue is whether the owners of the transmission system should keep congestion 
charges or these should be assigned grid users based on some form of ownership rights. 
In Argentina, congestion rents enter a fund designated for expansion of the network 
(Fisher and Serra, 2000). In Brazil, failure to ensure sufficient grid capacity prior to the 
reform has created transmission bottlenecks that in turn result in segmentation of the 
system and give some firms regional market power. 
 
Although there are various models in place, there is currently a lack of workable models 
that satisfactorily address the above issues. The main problem here is the difficulty of 
developing theoretically efficient models that is, at the same time, simple enough for 
implementation. Avoidance of market power should be a major concern already at 
the design and implementation of sector restructuring. Addressing the issue at later 
stages through introduction of new rules or further major post reform restructuring tend 
to be difficult and face resistance form the vested interests in the existing structure. 
 
 
3.2 Incentive Regulation of Distribution Networks 
 
In most electricity systems, distribution networks account for 30%-40% of total costs of 
supply and exhibit substantial potential for efficiency improvements. In developing 
countries, due to technical and non-technical losses (e.g. unauthorized connections), the 
actual share of distribution costs may be substantially higher. In addition, distribution 
utilities are a crucial link between generators and franchise customers. Financial health 
of distribution companies affects the generators as counterparts in market transactions, 
provision of service to end-users, and financing necessary investments. 
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A central part of restructuring of the electricity sector is to introduce competition and 
price mechanism into generation and supply activities. The natural monopoly 
characteristics of distribution networks require that these remain under regulation. 
However, experience from reforming countries such as the UK and Norway 
suggests that establishing a regulatory framework for distribution utilities should 
be integrated in the reform design. 
 
Indeed, the costs of failure to implement an effective regulatory framework for 
distribution utilities can exceed the efficiency improvements gained in the competitive 
activities of the sector. For example, following the reform in New Zealand, between 
1991 and 2000, the real wholesale price of generation for residential users decreased 
significantly. However, the distribution companies operated under self-pricing based on 
information disclosure. In the absence of a firm framework for regulation of networks, 
the distribution charges have increased. As a result, the end-user price of electricity in 
real terms has increased considerably (Todd Energy, 2000). Table 4 shows that, in 
effect, network monopolies have captured the efficiency gains achieved in wholesale 
generation as well as a monopoly rent. 
 
Table 4: Real residential electricity prices in New Zealand before 
and after reform (cents per KWh-2000-prices) 
Source: Based on Todd Energy (2000) 
 31 March 1991 31 January 2000 
Wholesale price 6.41 3.64 
Transmission 1.97 1.45 
Distribution and 
Supply 
1.17 8.41 
(Distribution 5.24 + Supply 3.17) 
Total 9.55 13.5 
 
Many of the countries that have liberalized the electricity generation activity have also 
engaged in regulatory reform of the distribution network activities in the form of 
incentive-based regulation. As opposed to rate-of-return regulation which is essentially 
cost-based and guarantees a pre-determined return on capital, incentive regulation 
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rewards (or penalizes) the regulated firm based on comparison of some measure of 
actual performance against a reference performance. 
 
The most widely used incentive-based regulation schemes are price and revenue cap 
regulation based on the RPI-X model first adopted in regulation of telecommunication 
sector in the UK (see e.g. Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). In general, price and revenue cap 
regulation models have promoted cost savings in electricity and other network 
industries. Some Latin American countries, have adopted the “efficiency standard” 
approach to incentive regulation which uses efficient model firms (as opposed to actual 
firms) as reference for performance and determining allowable costs. Many developing 
countries have adopted some form of incentive regulation scheme for the network 
activities as part of their reform. 
 
Price and revenue cap models promote cost savings and can be combined with other 
incentive schemes. The main challenge for regulators is, on the one hand, to ensure that 
utilities can finance their investments and, on the other hand, to prevent above normal 
profits. In the United Kingdom, at privatisation, the government underestimated the 
potential for efficiency improvement in distribution utilities. This was only corrected by 
successive price control reviews. 
 
Profit sharing mechanisms can be incorporated into incentive schemes to reduce the 
potential for windfall profits. This approach has often been often used in regulation of 
investor-owned electric utilities in the United States. Table 5 shows that, in the United 
Kingdom, between 1991/2 and 1998/99 savings to residential customers from reduction 
in distribution and transmission charges have been 9%. During the same period, price 
reductions originating from competitive generation market have been 10% although this 
can largely be attributed to reduction in the cost of fuel. 
 
The focus of price cap regulation is on overall efficiency of the network utilities. Also, it 
is important that cost savings are not achieved at the expense of quality of service. It is 
often necessary to combine overall incentive regulation with targeted-incentive 
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schemes aimed at specific priority aspects of utilities operation. For example, 
minimum performance standards or targets coupled with reward and penalty schemes 
can be used to reduce network losses and increase the quality and availability of supply. 
 
Table 5: Sources of price reduction to UK domestic users 1991/2-1998/9 
Source: Littlechild (2000) 
Sources of Reduction  % 
Lower generation costs (mainly fuel) 10 
Lower distribution and transmission charges 9 
Lower supply business margin 1 
Lower fossil fuel levy* 9 
Total 29 
*
 The fossil fuel levy was introduced to limit the effect of reform of the sector 
on coal industry. The levy was gradually phased out. Price reduction due to 
lower levy can therefore not be attributed to the effect of reform on prices. 
 
Failure to incorporate quality of service standards in price and revenue cap regulation 
can result in lower quality of service. The case of Hungary shows that following the 
introduction of price cap regulation for transmission and distribution networks in 1997 
and in the absence of quality standards in the incentive schemes, some key indicators of 
quality of supply worsened (Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Performance change in Hungarian transmission/distribution utilities 
Source: ARERC-CEEE (2000) 
Indicator 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Outage per customer  
(KWh) 
0.895 0.726 0.838 1.294 
No. of breakdowns  
- high voltage 
53 36 24 35 
No. of breakdowns  
- medium voltage 
10,493 8,570 10,207 9,670 
Energy loss due to middle voltage 
breakdowns (MWh)  
4,510 3,452 4,096 3,788 
Duration of middle voltage breakdowns 
(hours) 
15,928 11,900 16,240 13,888 
No. of low voltage  
Breakdowns 
241,760 225,421 214,325 233,049 
No. of single faults  
per 1000 customers 
35,65 32,05 29,31 24,32 
No. of multiple faults per 1000 customers 13,32 13,06 13,26 12,00 
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3.3 Tariff and Subsidy Restructuring 
 
The concept of market-oriented electricity sector reforms is centered on the use of price 
mechanism in both competitive and regulated activities of the sector. Prices send strong 
signals to market participants and influence their behaviour and decisions. In order for 
the prices to be efficient and send correct signals, they need to be based on the true cost 
of providing the service and reflect the long-run marginal cost of addition of new 
capacity to the system. 
 
In many developing and transition economies, introduction of cost-reflective prices 
requires considerable restructuring of electricity prices and subsidy arrangements. The 
tariff structures often contain cross subsidies in the form of transfers from industrial and 
commercial users to residential customers and/or cross subsidies among different groups 
of residential customers. In practice, restructuring of tariffs generally involves 
substantial price increases for residential customers, as these are the main beneficiaries 
of cross-subsidy arrangements. At the same time, commercial and industrial users 
generally pay above-cost prices and are the likely beneficiaries of cost-reflective pricing 
and competition. 
 
Table 7 illustrates the tariff structure and cross subsidies in Thailand among different 
end-user groups in 2000. It should be noted that in many countries the extent of price 
distortions is considerably higher than in the case illustrated here. As shown in the table, 
small residential customers are partially subsidized by large residential customers. Also, 
the average residential tariff is below long-run marginal cost of serving this segment. In 
turn, residential customers, government institutions, and agricultural pumping are 
partially subsidized by consumer groups who pay above-LRMC tariffs. At the same 
time, the average tariff for all consumer groups is about the long-run marginal cost of 
the system. 
 
Figures 9a-b and 10a-b illustrate that, in recent years, residential electricity prices in 
several developing and transition economies have moved closer to average prices in the 
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OECD. At the same time, prices for industrial customers have tended to decrease. 
Figures 11a-b shows that in some countries, the ratio of residential to industrial prices 
has moved closer to average OECD price ratio. It is apparent from the figures that some 
of the Latin American and Eastern European countries have made significant progress in 
re-balancing their electricity prices. It should be noted that the reforms in many of these 
countries are still in early stages of implementation and it is likely that this trend will 
continue in the coming years. 
 
Table 7: Average electricity tariffs and marginal costs in Thailand in 2000 
Source: NEPO (2000) 
Customer Category 
Existing Retail 
Tariffs 
(Baht/kWh) 
Marginal Cost 
(i.e. no cross-
subsidies) 
(Baht/kWh) 
Existing Retail 
Tariffs as 
Percentage of 
Marginal Cost(%) 
Residential 2.2924 2.5988 88.2 
< 150 kWh/month 1.8836 2.7760 67.9 
> 150 kWh/month 2.5440 2.4359 104.4 
Small General Services 
(business customers with demand 
< 30kW) 2.8563 2.6966 105.9 
Medium General Services 
(business customers with demand 
of 30kW-2MW, and avg.  use of  
< 355,000kWh per month) 2.3097 2.3061 100.2 
Large General Services 
(business customers with demand 
in excess of 2MW, or consumption 
> 355,000 per month) 2.0705 1.9974 103.7 
Specific Business (mainly hotels) 2.1604 2.0050 107.8 
Government Institutions 2.3240 2.4912 93.3 
Agricultural Pumping 1.7969 2.2861 78.6 
Total 2.25573 2.2767 99.1 
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Figure 9a: Average residential electricity prices (US$/KWh) 
Source: SIEE Database, OLADE 
 
Figure 9b: Average residential electricity prices (US$/KWh) 
Sources: IEA Energy Prices & Taxes; Pakistan Power System Statistics;  
and Planning Commission, Government of India. 
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Figure 10a: Average residential electricity prices (US$/KWh) 
Source: SIEE Database, OLADE 
 
Figure 10b: Average residential electricity prices (US$/KWh) 
Sources: IEA Energy Prices & Taxes; Pakistan Power System Statistics;  
and Planning Commission, Government of India. 
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Figure 11a: Average residential electricity prices (US$/KWh) 
Source: SIEE Database, OLADE 
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Figure 11b: Average residential electricity prices (US$/KWh) 
Sources: IEA Energy Prices & Taxes; Pakistan Power System Statistics;  
and Planning Commission, Government of India 
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Economic theory suggests that cost-reflective prices result in net social welfare gain. 
This implies that the welfare economic gains by those who benefit from lower prices 
exceed the welfare losses incurred by those who stand to lose from price increases. 
However, without public interference no automatic transfer from gainers to (targeted) 
losers will take place to compensate the latter. At the same time, mapping and 
measurement of distributional aspects of tariff adjustments is an inherently complex task 
(Chang, 1997). In some circumstances a price increase to efficient levels may also be 
socially defendable. For example, in countries with very low rates of access the service 
is often only available to richer consumers. Therefore, a rate increase that eliminates the 
system’s deficit financed by the whole population and frees resources for improving 
access to others can be justifiable. 
 
For example, two important questions are the intensity and distribution of gains and 
losses across different groups of consumers. Welfare losses to some disadvantaged 
consumer groups can be much larger than the benefits accrued to many gainers. Also, in 
poorer countries losers generally constitute a very large portion of the population while 
the number of gainers can be far fewer. In addition, the higher the level of existing 
subsidies is the more noticeable are the distributional impacts of tariff re-balancing. 
 
There is considerable scope for efficiency improvement in distribution utilities. At the 
same time, tariff adjustments can play an important role in financial health of electricity 
distribution utilities and their ability in achieving these efficiencies. Price adjustments 
are therefore closely linked to the issue of privatization of distribution utilities. 
However, in many developing countries, the need for subsidies will be present for the 
foreseeable future. The important issue is to design subsidy schemes that address 
undesirable social impacts while limiting price distortions and adverse impacts on 
the economic efficiency of reforms. Some subsidy schemes can be either very costly as 
they also tend to benefit ineligible consumer groups (inclusivity issue), or that they do 
not reach the targeted groups (exclusivity issue). 
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Inadequate attention to the distributional implications of price increases can severely 
affect the progress of the reform process. In India, the state of Orissa restructured and 
privatized the distribution companies. Despite substantial and politically difficult tariff 
increases (11% in 1997, 9.3% in 1998, and 4.5% in 2000), the privatized utilities 
experience severe financial difficulties. The companies are unable and lack incentives to 
invest in efficiency improvement measures (TND, 2002; Business Line 2001a; 2001b). 
 
Price changes should also take the prevailing macroeconomic conditions of the country 
into consideration. For example, price adjustments in a high inflationary economic 
environment can be particularly difficult. Table 8 shows that, in Estonia, despite tariff 
increases between 1995 and 1997, electricity prices in real terms have actually declined. 
At the same time, high economic growth can help the tariff adjustment process by 
reducing the impact of price increases. 
 
Table 8: Development of electricity prices in Estonia. 
Source: Kraav (2000) 
 Avg. Price  
(cent/kWh, excl. VAT) Price Index 
 
Real Price Index 
1992 9.2 100 100 
1993 13.1 143 62 
1994 18.6 203 58 
1995 30.5 332 75 
1996 35.2 382 68 
1997 44.5 409 65 
1998 51.0 469 69 
1999 53.0 576 81 
 
Political sensitivity of tariff increases can even affect the regulatory design and divert 
this from desired models. For example, in most Eastern European countries, political 
sensitivity of tariff increases has contributed to maintaining a formal degree of 
ministerial influence in the activities of electricity sector regulators concerning prices 
(Stern, 1999). For example, in Hungary, the regulator's decisions regarding prices have 
to be approved by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
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World Bank (2000a) evaluates the performance of the major subsidy schemes for utility 
bills in Eastern and Central European countries. The evaluation uses household survey 
data and information from government agencies to assign scores to coverage, targeting, 
predictability, pricing distortion, and administration costs and difficulty of the schemes 
as assessment criteria. The 'lifeline tariff with 3 blocks', ‘lifeline tariff with floating 
blocks’ and 'non earmarked cash transfer' subsidy schemes obtained among the scored 
scores while 'no disconnection', ‘across-the-board price subsidy’ and 'burden limit on 
actual utility expenditure' arrangement received among the lowest total scores.2 
 
Carefully designed subsidy schemes can gain important popular support from tax 
payers as providers of subsidies. A consumer survey in the UK suggests that between 
67% of respondents were in favor of electricity subsidies for low-income groups (Doble, 
Markou, and Waddams, 1998). Tariff restructuring should be carefully planned ahead of 
the reform process and explicitly included in the reform implementation strategy. In 
developing countries, tariff adjustments should be introduced in steps. Gradual 
efficiency improvements in utilities and effective transfer of the gains can also reduce 
the negative impact of price increases. 
 
Further, in the absence of public intervention, private participation and cost-reflective 
tariffs are likely to have adverse consequences on improving access to low-income 
groups and rural populations. Many developing countries are yet to provide access to 
large groups of populations. For example, in some African countries the overall rate of 
electrification is below 10%. 
 
Private actors often lack incentives to extend service to “unprofitable” and often low-
usage customers. At the same time, it is believed that while many low-income groups 
can not afford to pay for connection to the service they are willing and able to pay for 
the electricity they use. Recognising this, some developing countries have adopted 
                                                          
2
 Double weights assigned to coverage and targeting criteria. Burden limit schemes cap the maximum 
share of income spent on utility bills for specific consumer groups. 
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innovative approaches to improving access to service. Some successful schemes such as 
in Chile are based on facilitating access through mobilization of local communities 
combined with one-off subsidies to lowest-bidding private sector actors providing the 
connection (see e.g Tomkins, 2001; World Bank, 2000d). 
 
Although some innovative approaches to address poverty alleviation and electrification 
issues have emerged, more progress is yet to be made in tackling these issues. In order 
to ensure popular backing for and sustainability of reform, it is important that 
efficiency gains from the reforms are passed on to consumers. For the foreseeable 
future the governments should be prepared to play an active role to protect low-
income consumers and ensure that services are extended to un-served rural areas. 
 
 
3.4 Sequence of Reform Measures 
 
As the body of evidence from reforms in different countries has grown, there is some 
agreement among practitioners and academics with regard to the main steps of a sound 
reform design and the order in which these can be introduced. The main elements of the 
reform models, in the suggested order, are: (i) regulation, (ii) restructuring, (iii) and 
privatization (see e.g. IADB, 2001a). At the same time, it is generally recognized that 
the design of particular reforms should adapt to specific characteristics of the sector in 
question such as resource availability, size of the system, and institutional endowment. 
 
Therefore, generalized models could only serve as a broad reference when designing or 
assessing specific reforms. Within this background, this section outlines a generic 
reform model based on the framework suggested in Newbery (2001) before reviewing 
the actual international practice to date. Figure 12 shows a schematic illustration of the 
main measures and implementation sequence of the generic reform model described in 
the above. 
 
 
    Electricity law     Separate/Regulate D          Separate/Regulate T            Split G                Privatize 
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     Regulator             Access/Pricing              Access/ Pricing             Power mkt.            D, T, G 
 
Figure 12: Main steps in a generic reform model 
 
i. The electricity sector reform must have a clear legal basis. Some of the most 
important reform measures such as restructuring of the sector, private 
participation, and establishment and role of regulatory bodies often require new 
legislation. In reforming (developed and developing) countries, this has 
generally been achieved in the form of adopting an electricity law or act. The 
law also signals a country’s intentions and indicates commitment to undertake 
the reform and reduces the uncertainty associated with crucial issues such as 
property rights and conflict resolution procedures. 
 
ii. Introduction of most types of reforms requires some degree of restructuring of 
the sector. The main aim of restructuring is to separate the potentially 
competitive activities (generation and supply) of the sector from the natural 
monopoly segments (transmission and distribution). In general, careful 
consideration should be given to the initial restructuring of the sector, as they 
often tend to create vested interests that may resist or complicate subsequent 
adjustments to the structure of the sector. 
 
Unbundling should often start with separating the distribution business from 
the generation and transmission activities of the system. The main argument for 
this is that much of the inefficiencies in the sector originates from, or is 
perpetuated through, the distribution activity. Distribution is the closest link in 
the chain of activities to customers and revenue collection. In many developing 
countries, subsidized and low tariffs combined with poor bill collection rates 
have weakened the financial health of the distribution segment. Also, 
distribution networks in many developing countries exhibit very high technical 
and non-technical losses of electricity and poor quality of service. In addition, 
in many countries many urban and rural areas are yet to be connected by the 
distribution system. Further, experience in developed and developing countries 
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suggests that there is considerable scope for efficiency improvement in the 
distribution segment. 
 
Other structural issues concerning the distribution system can also be addressed 
at this stage. For example, the desired number of distribution utilities should 
also be decided at this stage. Important considerations here are maintaining 
sufficient number of firms for the purpose of yardstick regulation, availability 
multiple sources of information to the regulator while, and ability of firms to 
benefit from economies of scale. Also, separation of supply business from 
distribution could take place at this stage. However, if the feasibility of retail 
competition is not certain this can be deferred to a later time. 
 
iii.   Distribution business should be subject to regulation. In particular, experience 
from developed and developing countries have shown that incentive regulation 
has resulted in considerable efficiency improvements. Cost-reflective pricing 
through tariff re-balancing can take place at this stage to eliminate or reduce 
(cross) subsidies. 
 
Appropriate measures for reducing the rate of non-collection and terms of 
disconnection should be introduced. It may be argued that privatization can 
reduce non-collection and system loss. However, these issues are highly 
political and sensitive in nature and rate increases and disconnection for non-
payment ultimately need political approval and privatization will not remove 
the government’s responsibility and role. It can also be argued that if the 
government is not able to initiate these measures, private (and often foreign) 
ownership alone could at best only partially achieve this. Such important issues 
should ideally be addressed before ownership structure of distribution business 
could be decided. Failure to do so will inevitably be reflected in the price that 
private investors will be willing to pay for the distribution networks and their 
future investments in the acquired assets. 
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In addition, rules for access to the network and appropriate charges should also 
be set out at this stage. A regulated third party access (rTPA) is generally the 
preferred arrangement as negotiated third party access (nTPA) in some 
countries has lead to disputes and uncertainty. The main considerations here are 
to avoid discrimination among the users of the networks, reduce uncertainty for 
new entries, and define the framework for future expansion of the system. 
 
iv.  Separate the transmission activity from generation and establish the former as 
separate entity. A clear division of these activities is a prerequisite for effective 
competition in the generation segment. Vertical ownership between generation 
and distribution can lead to discrimination against independent generators, 
distort competition, and discourage new generators to enter. As with the 
distribution activity, clear rules for access to the grid (preferably rTPA) should 
be defined at this stage. Also, an independent system operator (ISO) should 
ideally be in charge of dispatch and reliable operation of the system. Similar to 
distribution segment, transmission should be subject to incentive regulation. 
 
The central issues in transmission regulation are to develop procedures for 
managing and pricing of congestion and to create incentives for efficient 
investments in expansion of networks. Although the transmission system 
accounts for approximately 10-20% of total costs of electricity supplies, under-
developed transmission grids can distort competition and lead to very high 
generation prices. The experience of some reforming countries some reforming 
countries such as in Brazil has shown that network congestion can result in 
segmentation of the system and regional market power. Although reforming 
countries have adopted various approaches to network congestion management 
and pricing, problems still persist and this aspect of reform is still work in 
progress. As the economic costs of under-developed transmission systems are 
usually very large a plausible case for some over-dimensioning of the grid 
during the initial years of the reform can be made. 
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v.  Split the existing generation capacity into several units and establish a 
wholesale electricity market. Effective competition and market-oriented 
arrangements require several generators. Wholesale markets can be structured 
as single-buyer model, marginal cost-based pools, and price-based spot market. 
The critical issue at this stage is to create sufficient number of units with varied 
generation mix for a competitive market. It is important to avoid having 
incumbents with dominant positions as this leads to market power and may 
discourage new entry into the sector. Changes to the structure of the generation 
segment at later stages of the reform tend to be difficult. Allow new entry by 
independent power producers (IPPs). These firms can enter the generation 
market as merchant plants that assume all the risk or through long-term power 
purchase agreements (PPAs) with existing generators or large customers. 
 
Countries with small electricity systems face limitations with regard to the 
number of firms that can be formed from the existing generation capacity. This 
has bearings for the type of market and competition-oriented solutions that will 
be discussed in other section. For some small systems, competition can emerge 
in the long run through new entries in the sector, as growth in demand and 
electrification will gradually increase the size of the system.  However, new 
entry can be a slow process and will need some time to contribute to 
competition. 
 
vi. Where privatization of the existing is feasible and desirable, this should 
preferably start with the distribution function. Distribution utilities are the 
generators’ counterpart in most market arrangements. Privatization of 
generation can take place after the structure, regulation, and ownership status of 
distribution companies is clear. Privatization of transmission grid is less 
pressing and can take place at the same time or later when workable network 
congestion and system expansion arrangements are in place. 
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Appendix 1 illustrates of the main features and sequence of reform measures for the 
countries in Table 2. The figure reveals noticeable similarities as well as differences 
across the countries. The reform in most Latin American countries have evidently 
followed broadly similar paths to the generic model outlined in the above. 
 
For example, the sequence of reform measures reform in Argentina almost resembles a 
textbook case. The main exception here is Brazil to which we will return later. Also, 
apart from Chile and Argentina, the main stages of reforms in Latin America have been 
implemented in relatively short matter of time (1-2 years). In contrast, the reforms in 
South Asia, East Asia, and Eastern Europe have been rather lengthy processes. Indeed, 
most of these reforms may be regarded as work in progress. 
 
The context and starting points of reforming electricity sectors differ considerably in 
terms of stage of economic development, size, and structure. However, here the 
evidence as whether or how these factors affect the success or failure of reform is 
inconclusive. In order to highlight this point, the next section examines the reforms in a 
few selected cases in some detail. 
 
 
4. Focus on Selected Reforms 
 
4.1 Flawed Regulatory Design: Crises in Brazil and California 
 
A crucial test of electricity sector reform and regulatory design is whether they ensure 
dynamic efficiency through private investments. The recent electricity crisis in Brazil 
and California has shows that, in developed as well as in developing countries, the costs 
of flawed regulatory design and failure to secure new investments can surpass the 
benefits of reform. Although the two electricity systems do not share many 
characteristics, they exemplify failures in regulatory design in two large (one developed 
and one developing) economies to secure dynamic efficiency of their electricity sectors. 
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The main objective of electricity sector reforms is to improve the overall efficiency of 
the sector. Reforms seek to achieve this objective through (i) the introduction of market 
mechanisms into potentially competitive activities (generation and supply), (ii) incentive 
regulation of natural monopoly segments (transmission and distribution), and (iii) 
increased private participation. The prerequisite for a well functioning reform is a 
carefully designed regulatory framework that is sensitive to the specific characteristics 
of individual power sectors and country-specific economic conditions.  
 
Electricity supply industry is highly capital intensive and the bulk of expected efficiency 
gains from the reforms can therefore be achieved in the long run through prudent and 
timely investments. In a well-functioning market-oriented sector, investments in new 
generation capacity play a dual role. First, new investments will ensure necessary 
expansion and reliability of the system as demand for electricity gradually grows. 
Second, threat of new entry limits consistent opportunistic behavior and exercise of 
market power by existing generators.  
 
However, the relatively long lead-time in new investments in the sector must be aligned 
with short-term technical requirements of the system. The transition from a regulated to 
a market-oriented sector can result in tighter balance of supply and demand. In order to 
ensure sustainability of the reform in the long run, regulatory design must be capable of 
effectively dealing with short-term contingencies and imbalances that may arise.  
  
A prerequisite for new investments to fulfill their role in functioning of the market is 
unconstrained and demand-responsive supply of generation capacity. Joskow (1983) 
foresaw a comfortable margin of generation capacity, a slow growing demand, and 
abundant supply of natural gas, as important preconditions for a successful reform. The 
Brazilian and Californian electricity sectors were liberalized at a time when there was 
surplus generation capacity in the systems. However, it was not long before that strong 
demand growth reduced the excess capacity. California and Brazil both experienced 
high natural gas prices during their crisis.  
 
Working Paper CMI EP 08/DAE 0226, August 2002, Dept. of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge 
 
34
 
In principle, due to the long lead-time of generation projects and price inelastic demand, 
sudden increase in growth rate of demand for electricity is inherently difficult to match 
by new investments. Access to unconstrained new electricity generation resources is 
critical to sustainability of power sector reforms. The regulatory designs in Brazil 
and California failed on this point. 
 
The electricity crisis in California was the result of a combination of unfavorable 
exogenous factors exacerbated by deficient regulatory design. The crises affected 
California and other states connected to western grid. However, the fact that those 
municipal utilities in California that opted out of the deregulated market and other states 
fared better than California suggests that regulatory design played an important role in 
transforming a power shortage into a crisis situation (World Bank, 2001b).  
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, California began to import electricity through new 
transmission lines connecting the state to Northwestern states (mainly hydro) and 
Arizona. During the years prior to the reform in California, existence of excess capacity, 
low demand forecasts, uncertainty about sector restructuring meant that little new 
generation capacity was built in the interconnected system in the western states. 
 
However, strong growth in demand for electricity fueled by increased economic activity 
and hot summer created an imbalance between supply and demand. Indeed, during the 
1990s, the rate of growth in California was slower than in other western states. This 
coincided with emergence of dry years with reduced hydroelectricity production in 
northwest. Above-average hydroelectricity production in the years prior to the reform 
had helped mask the emerging mismatch between demand and supply.  
 
During the crisis the western states also experienced unusually high natural gas prices. 
This together with steep increase in the price of tradable NOx emissions permits 
resulted in increases in generation costs and in particular sharp rise in marginal cost of 
natural gas-based peak load plants. The market imbalance was further exacerbated by 
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significantly higher than normal levels of unavailable capacity due to maintenance 
(Joskow, 2001). 
 
The main flaw in California’s regulatory design was to prevent utilities from entering 
long-term contracts. Having been forced to divest much of their generation assets, the 
utilities were referred to the spot market for nearly all their supply requirements. Long-
term contracts can limit the volume of trade in the spot market and thus reduce short-
term price fluctuations. A well-functioning contract market can also reduce uncertainty 
in new investments and facilitate access to reserve capacity and a stable stream of new 
generation resources.   
 
The retail price caps intended for recovering stranded costs of past over-investments de-
coupled end-user prices from competitive wholesale prices leaving utilities unable to 
recover their costs and with credit problems. Also, retail price caps removed price-
responsiveness and incentive to energy saving from the demand side. When wholesale 
price caps were eventually imposed they were not always sufficient to cover the 
generation costs caused by high costs of natural gas and NOx permits. Further, political 
influence and interest groups created a ‘market design be committee’ and alienated the 
reform initiative from the technical characteristics and realities of the sector (Joskow, 
2001). Finally, inter-dependence of federal and multi-state energy and environmental 
regulation resulted in delayed response to market conditions as the crisis was unfolding. 
 
The case of California has also shown that flawed regulatory design can lead to market 
power and exercise of strategic behaviour by market participants. Joskow and Kahn 
(2002) examine the crisis in summer 2000 and find that market fundamentals natural gas 
prices, NOx emissions prices, increase in demand, and supply shortages during the 
period could not explain the observed price levels. The study found that generators and 
marketers exercised market power through unilateral withholding of generation capacity 
contributed to worsening the electricity crisis in California. Similarly, Borenstein, 
Bushnell and Wolak (2002) examine the California power market between June 1998 
and October 2000. They found that increased production costs, competitive rents, and 
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market power were responsible for 21%, 20%, and 59% respectively of increased 
expenditures on electricity.   
 
In Brazil, generation is predominantly based on hydroelectricity and some very large 
plants produce a substantial portion of the total output. A complicating factor is that the 
water used by hydroelectric plants has alternative uses. This has created conflicts of 
interest among the users of water. These conflicts have traditionally been resolved 
internally within the public ownership framework and there is resistance against leaving 
the management of these resources to private enterprises. In addition, there are 
considerable economic benefits in operational coordination of the plants. The economic 
benefits of coordination of these hydro-resources are estimated at approximately $2.2 
bill. per year (Araúo, 2000). 
 
The reform in Brazil has failed to adequately address particular features of the sector's 
resource-base. The uncertainty surrounding the future of ownership and operational 
aspects of hydroelectric resources has led to decline in private involvement in hydro as 
well as in thermal resources. Instead, private investors have shown more interest in 
acquiring existing plants than investing in new resources. In contrast to the objectives of 
the reform, most of the investments in the sector have in recent years been undertaken 
by public entities. 
 
As a result of the under-investment in new generation capacity that preceded the reform, 
the country has experienced extensive power outages that can further aggravate the 
current economic problems. In addition, lack of investment in the transmission network 
has resulted in periodic bottlenecks in the system and segmentation of the market that 
has effectively divided the market into four regional markets (Araúo, 2001). 
 
A new regulatory body (National Water Agency, ANA) has recently been established to 
draw the rules for water use and settlement of conflicts. However, this task and thus the 
prevailing uncertainty are likely to take several years. Newbery (2002) suggests that 
while early privatization signals government’s commitment to reform, it could also take 
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place after introduction of competition and regulatory reform. In Brazil, the pressure to 
relieve the state from financial burden of required investments in the sector and the need 
for privatization proceeds led to divestiture of assets before the rules of the wholesale 
electricity market and ownership issues of vast hydroelectric resources had been settled. 
 
The examples of electricity sector reforms in Brazil and California highlight the 
importance of coordination among different regulatory agencies and energy-
environmental objectives. In order to attract private investments, the regulatory 
design must ensure a workable framework for division and coordination of 
mandates among the different regulatory agencies. 
 
An additional issue is the interdependency of regulatory design with regional and local 
interests. In both reforms, lack of institutional arrangements for resolving the conflicts 
between reform objectives and these interests has affected addition of new generation 
capacity. In Brazil, approximately 40% of generation capacity were outside of the 
federal government’s control and many of the states did not support the reform. In 
California, in addition to strict environmental regulations and lengthy approval 
processes, local interests have been able to block new projects. The regulatory design 
must take areas of conflict with political interests and judicial rights of regional 
and local interests into consideration. 
 
In conclusion, a fourth condition for implementation of a market-oriented reform can be 
added to those mentioned above. Transmission systems are generally not designed with 
a view of operating in a deregulated market. The transmission system at the time of 
reform should be sufficiently developed for the existing and expected generation 
capacity and avoid bottlenecks that lead to segmentation of the power market. A 
comfortable transmission capacity margin lowers the risk of failure of reform by 
reducing service outages, market power, and siting of generation plants. In Brazil 
under-investment in transmission systems began prior to the sector reform, while the 
transmission grids need to be improved prior to reform in order to support a liberalized 
electricity market. 
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4.2 Workable Reforms - The Cases of Bolivia and Norway 
 
The aim of this subsection is three-fold. First, workable electricity sector reforms can be 
implemented in developed as well as in developing countries. Second, contrary to some 
beliefs, small countries can implement and sustain workable regulatory reforms. Third, 
reforms can, under some circumstances, be implemented without full-scale 
privatization. The cases of reforms in Bolivia and Norway show that appropriate 
regulatory design is crucial to a successful reform. 
 
Norway was among the first countries to liberalize her electricity sector. The Norwegian 
electricity sector is almost entirely based on hydroelectricity. Availability of low-cost 
hydroelectric resources has played an important role in the industrialization of the 
country. These resources are spread in the country and establishment of energy intensive 
industries in the vicinity of generation plants has contributed to economic development 
of many local communities where these resources are situated. 
 
The Norwegian reform was initiated in 1991, and involved functional unbundling, and 
introduction of competition into the generation and supply segments of the sector. The 
Norwegian electricity sector consists of over 340 utilities, of which 190 have generation 
facilities and over 200 are involved in distribution, serving a population of 4.2 million. 
Many of the utilities are either vertically integrated or have formed alliances. The 
generation capacity is owned by the state (30%), private (15%), and municipal/county 
(55%) owned utilities and has not been affected by the reform. 
 
The restructuring of the sector involved separation of the transmission network from the 
state-owned company (Statkraft) and establishment of this as a new state-owned 
corporation (Statnett). A spot market for electricity was established and administered by 
a subsidiary of Statnett which, later merged with a subsidiary of the Swedish grid 
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company and formed the Nordic spot market (Nord Pool). A common carriage system 
for access to transmission and distribution networks was also established. 
 
The Norwegian reform did not attempt to privatize the sector. Instead, it introduced a 
market-oriented reform in a sector dominated a by state-owned and a large number of 
municipal and county-owned utilities. Norway has traditionally been successful in 
maintaining state-owned enterprises that operate on a commercial basis at arms-length 
from direct political intervention. In addition, regional and local communities are well 
organized and politically influential and the government could not initiate a change in 
the ownership of utilities owned by these authorities. The reform in Norway followed a 
pragmatic approach to regulatory design that avoided conflict areas that could 
complicate or hamper the restructuring process. 
 
The Bolivian reform involved the restructuring of the National Interconnected System 
(NIS) which covers most of the country. The transmission and generation activities of 
the state-owned utility ENDE were separated. The transmission system was established 
as a common carrier, which was subsequently privatized. The generation capacity of the 
largest utility ENDE (402 MW) was split into three separate companies and the assets of 
these new companies were capitalized in 1995. The second largest generator COBE, 
(142 MW) which was already in private hands divested its distribution business the 
same year. All distribution utilities were privatized with the exception of Santa Cruz 
utility CRE, which remained a cooperative. 
 
The post-reform NIS consists of four generators, one transmission, and six distribution 
companies. The isolated systems outside NIS consist of a number of rural cooperatives. 
Vertical integration is allowed only outside the NIS. The capitalized generation 
companies have invested in new capacity and four new generation companies have also 
entered the sector. Since 1995, generation capacity has grown from 544 MW to 1,234 
MW in 1999. The generation mix of the sector is approximately one-third hydroelectric 
and two-thirds thermal. 
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The Bolivian and Norwegian reforms have succeeded in transferring some of the 
benefits of the reform to the consumers in terms of lower prices. In Bolivia, between 
1996 and 2000, the spot price of electricity has decreased from US$18/MWh to 
US$14/MWh. Another sign of relative success of the Bolivian capitalization model is 
the willingness of foreign companies to participate in the program and future 
investments in the sector. Unlike electricity reforms in Brazil and California, the 
Bolivian restructuring effort functioned reasonably well during a period of high-growth 
demand. In 1999 alone, demand for electricity grew by 7% (Moen, 2000). 
 
Implementation of large-scale privatization programs may require a forceful political 
agenda such as the one in the case of the UK. The Bolivian and Norwegian reforms 
show that broad public or mixed ownership forms may reduce potential political, 
environmental, and ownership conflicts that can complicate the reform process. It is 
noteworthy that also in the UK a substantial portion of the privatized companies’ shares 
was offered to the public. The Bolivian reform shows that while transmission and 
distribution activities were privatized, a public-private co-ownership through 
capitalization was chosen for the generation segment. This was due to the fact that the 
transmission and distribution companies were not in urgent need of new capital. The 
case of Norway shows that different ownership forms can co-exist in a generation 
market dominated by a large number of competing state and locally owned firms. 
 
It should be noted however, that both Bolivian and Norwegian power sectors are well-
endowed with endogenous energy resources. This provides a convenient starting point 
for implementing the electricity sector reforms. In an attempt to explain the occurrence 
of electricity sector reforms across OECD countries, Drillisch and Riechmann (1998) 
find that a country’s overall energy fuel sufficiency is a significant factor, and even 
more significant than fuel independence of the electricity sector. Another characteristic 
shared by Bolivia and Norway is that both countries had relatively efficient and 
financially viable electricity sectors prior to the initiation of their reforms. 
 
The Bolivian Capitalization 
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Under the Bolivian reform model, strategic investors committed to investments equal to 
the market value of assets being capitalized in the generation companies. The new 
capital entering the companies remained within the companies and these funds were 
earmarked for modernization and further development of the sector. In addition, the 
management of companies was transferred to private investors. At the same time, 
ownership of the share of the state in the companies (50%) was transferred to national 
pension funds for the benefit of the whole population. In 1997, these funds paid US$ 
248 to elderly citizens (World Bank, 1999). The Bolivian capitalisation and reform 
model presents a number of potential benefits that are of relevance for some developing 
countries: 
 
i. Capitalization secures new investment in the sector and ensures a degree of 
expansion of the sector through existing companies and contributes towards 
sustainability of the reform during the initial years. 
 
ii. Capitalization encourages efficiency improvements in the use of existing 
assets by transferring the management of companies to new investors. 
 
iii. Broad ownership base resulting from capitalization allows consumers to 
benefit from efficiency gains from the reform on the ownership side as well 
as in the form of lower prices. 
 
iv. Capitalization can create mutual interests between the companies and the 
public. This can reduce the potential for future conflicts, which in turn 
reduces uncertainty to private investors. 
 
The examples discussed here indicate that small developed as well as developing, 
countries can implement workable reforms. However, there remain significant 
challenges ahead. In Norway, since the early 1980s, investments have gradually 
declined from a peak of NKr 15 bill. to NKr 4.9 bill. in 1998 (NMPE, 2000). A 
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significant portion of the investments in recent years has taken place in improving the 
existing facilities. 
 
Norway has traditionally been a net exporter of electricity. However, excess capacity at 
the time of the reform has now been surpassed by a growing demand. The impact of a 
few dry years on the hydroelectric system is unclear. Interconnections with other Nordic 
systems have served as a buffer and Norway has, since 1996 (with the exception of 
1999), been a net importer of electricity. Long-term reliance on imported electricity 
does not represent a sustainable energy policy and implications of this clearly 
demonstrated during the recent California electricity crisis. 
 
The main challenges in the Bolivian electricity sector are similar to those of many 
developing countries namely tariff restructuring and electricity coverage. Bolivia has 
one of the lowest electrification rates in Latin America. In 1999, urban electrification in 
the country was 72% and, since the reform, rural electrification has seen a considerable 
increase from 14% to 19%. 
 
In Bolivia, the proceeds from the award of concessions to distribution utilities are 
directed towards electrification of rural areas. In addition, in order to encourage 
distribution utilities to expand their service territories, the Bolivian Electricity Law 
allows for inclusion of the immediate 100 meters surrounding the lines to companies’ 
concession areas. 
 
 
5. Special reform issues in developing countries 
 
5.1 Reforming small electricity systems 
 
In the light of the difficulties experienced by some reforming developed and developing 
countries, an emerging and increasingly important issue that is posed is whether or to 
what extent countries with small electricity systems can reform their sectors. As many 
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developing countries are at some stage of or contemplating to embark on reforming their 
electricity sectors, the sheer number of developing countries with small electricity 
systems stresses the importance of reform issues in such systems. About 60 developing 
countries have systems with peak demands that are smaller than 150 MW, while another 
30 countries are between 150 and 500 MW, and further 20 countries are between 500 
and 1000 MW (IADB, 2001b). 
 
Broadly, the main reform issues in small developing countries can be divided into 
systemic and regulatory constraints. The systemic aspect is mostly concerned with the 
physical size of the electricity systems in these countries. While most textbook reform 
models prescribe competitive electricity markets many of the systems are simply too 
small to be divided up into several competing firms. In addition, there is a trade-off 
between having several competing generators and economies of scale. For example, 
efficient size of a combine cycle gas turbine (CCGT) is about 400 MW.3 The issue is 
whether the efficiency gains from competing small or sub-optimal units out-
weights diseconomies of scale and increased transaction costs of an unbundled 
system. 
 
In addition, most international investors tend to favor having a major presence in the 
countries they are involved. For small countries, attempts to limit the size of participants 
in the market can indeed further reduce the already limited number of potential investors 
and entry in the market. Further, costs and resource requirements of complicated spot 
markets and trading arrangements make applicability of advanced markets such the UK 
model less advantageous. 
 
Many developing countries with small electricity systems will be well advised to 
replace the pursuit of ‘competition in the market’ in their sectors with the more 
modest and simpler models of ‘competition for the market or contracts’. Three such 
models are the single-buyer, bilateral contracts markets, and management contracts. 
 
                                                          
3
 Some countries may however have the benefit of having smaller hydroelectric resources. 
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In the contract market model, generators compete to sell electricity to unbundled 
distribution utilities. Within this framework the transmission utility can be in charge of 
administering the contracts, dispatch, and power balancing. A problem with bilateral 
contracts model is, in the absence of retail competition, to provide the distribution 
utilities with the correct incentives to purchase electricity at the best price and delivery 
terms rather than a simple cost pass through method. A possible solution to the problem 
is however through benchmarking of purchased power by distribution utilities. 
 
In the single-buyer model, an independent entity or the transmission utility is mandated 
to purchase electricity from competing generators and resell to distribution utilities. 
Some of the potential problems with the single-buyer model are possibility of corruption 
and political interference in the operation of the system (see e.g. World Bank, 2000b). 
However, for small countries with fewer reform options a workable arrangement may 
still be found to be preferable to the traditional regulated vertically integrated utility 
model. 
 
The benefits and feasibility of single-buyer and multiple-contracts models for individual 
countries of should also weighted against adoption of management contract 
arrangements. The main advantages of management contracts are that these can be 
cheaper to implement and require less regulatory resources. However, the benefits of 
management contracts must be viewed against the backdrop of difficulties such as 
creating appropriate incentives, negotiating terms of contracts, and defining 
performance standards (see e.g. World Bank, 1995). 
 
In addition to the systemic issues, many developing countries with small systems are 
faced with the lack of regulatory resources. In many of these countries, the economic 
and political institutions necessary for well functioning of regulatory authorities are 
weak. In addition, many developing countries face shortage of qualified human 
resources to staff the new regulatory and supervisory bodies established as part of the 
reform. Lack of economic resources and shortage of regulatory experience and skills 
leads to a disproportionate asymmetry of expertise necessary to implement and oversee 
Working Paper CMI EP 08/DAE 0226, August 2002, Dept. of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge 
 
45
 
reform measures and counter the weight of major international investors (see e.g. Stern, 
2001). 
 
Many countries with small systems may be well advised to initially aim for simpler 
but more feasible solutions such as the single-buyer model. This should however be 
combined with maintaining some degree of flexibility for adjustments in the future to 
avoid market and ownership conditions that constrain future development of the reform 
process. For example, a key issue is to ensure some flexibility for integrating the 
existing IPPs into the future structure of the sector (see e.g. Wolf and Halpern, 2001). 
An evolutionary approach to reform can benefit from the following future 
developments: 
 
i. emergence of regional electricity markets in some parts of the world such as 
in Central America increases the level of competition, 
 
ii. technological progress can reduce the scale disadvantage of smaller plants, 
 
iii. the size of the market will slowly grow as the growth rate of demand in 
most developing countries is high and electrification will gradually increase 
the size of the system, and 
 
iv. regulatory expertise and experience can be built-up gradually to meet the 
challenges of more complex market forms. In addition, simpler models of 
wholesale power markets allow the existing scarce regulatory resources to 
be spent on regulation of distribution and transmission utilities. The 
experience of many reforming countries has shown considerable potential 
for efficiency gains in the networks (see Domah and Pollitt, 2001). 
 
 
5.2 Weak institutional endowment 
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There is a strong case for the notion that the design of electricity sector reforms should 
take the specific characteristics of the sector in question into consideration. The 
experience emerging from reforming countries suggests that the scope of this argument 
extends beyond the systemic characteristics of the sectors such as size, resource mix, 
and structure. The reform will ultimately have to fit into and function within the 
larger framework of the country’s institutional capacity. Therefore, policy makers 
should make realistic assumptions with regard to the political and institutional 
endowments of the countries (see e.g. Bergara, Henisz, and Spiller, 1997). 
 
In many developing countries, the electricity sector reforms take place within 
institutional settings that are characterised by unstable political systems, interventionist 
governments, unclear legislation on property rights, and lack of judicial independence 
and credibility, and corruption. In addition, shortage of skilled human resources 
combined with the lack of regulatory experience and traditions constraint their ability to 
initiate and sustain the reform process. 
 
It is important that those engaged in reform recognise a country’s institutional 
capabilities that have a bearing for the electricity sector and reform process. Recognition 
of institutional weaknesses will lead decision-makers to more realistic and suitable 
regulatory designs and reform measures. 
 
Most reforming countries have signalled their commitment to reform and established its 
legal basis in an electricity law or act. Although this does not necessarily guarantee a 
correct implementation and success of the reform, it is an important step forward. Lack 
of clarity in property rights can also to some extent be addressed through appropriate 
legislation. 
 
Establishment of credible dispute resolution and appeal procedures can reduce the 
risk of regulatory taking and compensate for the lack of independent judiciary. For 
example, in Bolivia, a new authority was established to resolve the disputes between 
regulatory agencies and companies. In many countries reform initiative have not been 
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limited to the electricity sector. Assessment of reforms in other sectors can provide 
some indications with regard to institutional endowment of the country. 
 
Lack of regulatory experience, lack of funding, and shortage of human resources 
expertise results in weak regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies need to oversee the 
generation markets, regulate the networks, and award concessions and licenses while 
having experienced and resourceful corporations as their counterparts. Performing the 
variety of specialized regulatory tasks requires a level of fixed costs and resources. 
Many poorer and smaller countries are less able to provide the necessary basis for 
establishing the agencies. 
 
Measures such as the use of consultants, regional regulatory agencies, and international 
cooperation may enable some small and poor countries to provide minimum necessary 
regulatory oversight for modest reforms that by some accounts is estimated at around 
30-40 staff (Stern, 2000). International development organizations can play an 
important role by sponsoring cooperation, training, and exchange of experience 
among the regulators. 
 
It should also be noted that establishment of electricity regulatory agencies can coincide 
with those of other infrastructure industries such as gas, telecommunication, and 
transport. For some countries, the resource requirements for regulation of multiple 
industries may render establishment of multi-utility regulatory agencies a feasible 
and resource-saving option (Samarajiva et al., 2002; World Bank, 2001a). 
 
 
5.3 Corruption and political opportunism 
 
Another challenge to electricity sector reforms is that many of the required measures 
create opportunities for political opportunism and economic corruption (see e.g. World 
Bank, 2002). The experience with reforms to date has shown that vested political 
interests can oppose the reform or try to take advantage of the political process. 
Working Paper CMI EP 08/DAE 0226, August 2002, Dept. of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge 
 
48
 
Corruption can hamper the reform process and result in political pressure to stop the 
reforms. Corruption also tends to increases the cost and risk of business and limits 
private participation and competition in the market. 
 
Vested political interests and opportunism may also distort the reform measures. These 
could be in the form of attempts to preserve control over economic resources. For 
example, in Colombia, local politicians who enjoy influence in distribution utilities have 
shown considerable resistance to privatization of these firms. Political opportunism may 
take the form of gaining political scores with the constituencies. Also, the fact that 
reforms in LDCs generally involve restructuring of subsidies and tariffs makes them 
susceptible to political opportunism. For example, in India, the prospect of political gain 
and existence of considerable subsidies (in particular in the agriculture sector) has led 
some politicians to vow to maintain the low tariffs. 
 
While it is not possible to eliminate corruption entirely certain measures can reduce the 
problem. For example closed negotiated privatization or tendering PPAs from IPPs 
make corruption and irregularities easier. This has resulted in allegations and indications 
of low selling prices for privatized assets, high purchase prices for PPAs, and/or forcing 
selected business partners on firms.  
 
Corruption is also partly a consequence of a lack of appropriate rules, procedures, and 
institutions. For example, improving transparency and local participation in a 
Venezuelan municipality governance reform reduced corruption and increased 
performance and satisfaction with services (World Bank, 2000c). Therefore, 
transparency of procedures and participation for interest parties can help reduce 
corruption. In practical terms this means, for example when seeking IPPs or 
privatization open and competitive bidding process should be implemented. The rules 
and process should be transparent for the participants and other interest parties. 
 
Credibility of pricing policy and subsidies is crucial to financial health of companies 
and attracting private investments to the sector. In Chile, placing much of the decision 
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making power in the electricity law signaled assurance for private investments. 
Although such approach reduces the risk of regulatory taking, it tends to weaken the 
regulator. It also reduces the regulator’s flexibility to adopt to the changing conditions 
that emerge in the course of the reform process (Fischer and Serra, 2000). A weak 
regulator also increases the possibility of regulatory capture. 
 
Transparency of decision-making process can help the reforms strike a balance between 
possibility of regulatory taking and regulatory capture. In Colombia, for example, the 
regulatory decisions are made public on the internet. Transparency and free flow of 
information of regulatory process and decisions (i) reduce corruption, (ii) open for 
participation and insight by other interested parties such as consumers associations, 
potential investors, and (iii) put some pressure on participants to behave. 
 
 
5.4 A Role for International Organizations? 
 
The systemic and institutional characteristics of electricity sectors across developing 
countries offer different initial conditions to reform and capability to implement them. 
This has also bearing for international organizations that promote and support such 
reforms. The potential for and benefits of reforms should therefore be assessed on their 
individual merits. 
 
International organizations should distinguish between three groups of countries with 
respect to feasibility and approach to reform. First, some countries exhibit the basic 
conditions to reform and have the commitment and capacity to carry these out more or 
less independently. Second, some countries may have potential to reform in the future. 
These countries can develop institutional capacity and competence and can carry out 
reform with regulatory and financial assistance to restructure the sector in a transition 
period. 
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The third group of countries, in particular those with very small systems, lacking the 
conditions for developing institutional capacity, and unattractive to foreign investors. 
These countries have little realistic prospects for private participation and market-
oriented solution in the foreseeable future and need to be supported to achieve gradual 
improvements or to adopt measures such as management contracts. 
 
In many countries, corruption, bilateral negotiations, and lack of experience have 
resulted in costly PPAs whose terms and legitimacy have later been disputed. Another 
possible role for international organizations is to devise a mechanism of quality 
control and verification for bidding processes and award of contracts. 
 
Such system will promote transparency and reduce the scope for political and economic 
corruption in award of major contracts such as PPAs. This mechanism can also reduce 
the possibility of accusations of irregularities and renegotiations in award of contracts. 
The main benefit of the quality control arrangement is that it ultimately reduces the debt 
and equity risk to international investors. If the system obtains the status of a recognized 
mechanism that is beneficial to investors and governments, both parties will be 
interested or obliged to satisfy the requirements of such mechanism. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The experience form the past two decades has shown that achieving sustainable private 
participation and market-oriented electricity sector reforms are more complex than 
initially anticipated. The cases of the UK and California have demonstrated that even in 
developed economies reforms encounter problems and exhibit intended consequences. 
Developing countries have had to reform technically and financially less efficient 
systems with less developed private sectors, weak economic and political institutions, 
and shortage of human resources and regulatory experience.  
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It is now recognized that reforms need to pay ample and equal attention to systemic 
characteristics of the sector in question as well as inherent institutional capabilities of 
the country. However, while some systemic and institutional issues may be improved 
upon others should be regarded as given and reflected in the choice and design of 
reform model. The generic reform model discussed earlier highlighted much of the 
experience to date with reforms in developing countries. In this conclusion we revisit 
the model and supplement it with some additional remarks. 
 
The importance of cost-reflective tariffs and clear arrangements for necessary cross 
subsidies and transfers for continuity of reforms can not be under-emphasized. The 
pricing and subsidy issues should be addressed at the early stages of the reform. Lack of 
broad political commitment on pricing policy can distort the entire reform process. 
Indeed, as witnessed in the 1950s and 1960s in some Latin American countries, it was 
political opportunism and unsustainable tariffs that eventually led to nationalization of 
private electricity companies (Gómes-Ibáñez, 1999). 
 
Pricing and subsidy policy should ensure sufficient revenue streams for the distribution 
companies. The financial strength of these companies is important for their ability as 
counterparts in transaction with single-buyer agencies and generators. Also, financial 
weakness reduces the prospects of privatization and value of distribution companies. In 
addition, inadequately low prices reduce the companies’ incentive to improve revenue 
collection or investments in efficiency improvements. Incentive regulation of 
distribution companies has showed considerable potential for efficiency improvements 
and passing on cost savings to customers. Further, incentive regulation and private 
ownership can be separated. In some cases (e.g. Norway), incentive regulation can be a 
viable option under state and local ownership prior to or even without privatization.  
 
Another lesson of experience is that reformers must ensure that a well-functioning 
transmission grid is in place at the time of reform. The existing transmission systems at 
the time of reforms are not designed with a view of supporting liberalized electricity 
markets. Therefore, conditions such as network congestion, barriers to access, and 
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vertical integration with generators will create market power and prevent competition 
and new entry. The existing models for congestion management, allocation of common 
costs, and efficient system expansion of the grid leave some scope for improvement.  
 
Although well-developed systems may benefit form these regimes, it is doubtful that 
they can result in efficient configuration in under-developed and poorly managed 
electricity systems. For example, considerable mis-matches between transmission and 
generation can result in new production capacity that could be avoided with less costly 
grid improvements. At the early stages of reforms, the transmission grid could remain in 
state ownership. Considering the small share of transmission in total system costs, it is 
best to ensure the transmission design and capacity can support the system through the 
initial years of reform. 
 
The main expectations from wholesale markets are that competition will improve 
efficiency in the generation segment and lead to lower prices. In many countries with 
wholesale markets (or even IPPs) is that while profit incentive has brought about 
efficiency gains, the savings are, due to insufficient competition and market power, not 
necessarily passed on to consumers. Many reformers could justifiably concentrate on 
more modest reform models through competition for markets approaches such as single 
buyer arrangements and market for long-term contracts. A key issue here is to maintain 
a degree of flexibility for the future development of the reform. 
 
Many countries can benefit from adopting a single-buyer model combined with 
competition among the generators for supplying large users. Even at this modest level of 
reforms, some countries may find they do not have enough industrial customers to help 
competition among producers. Retail competition at best may remain an elusive long-
term objective for most countries. At present, the implementation costs and potential 
benefits of supply competition at the presence of subsidies, low average consumption, 
and insufficient competition do not seem promising. 
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With regard to the pace of reforms, an evolutionary progress is generally more plausible 
than window of opportunity approach that is sometimes advocated. The case of the state 
of Orissa in India shows that the timeframe required for reforms to develop roots tends 
to be longer than limited windows of opportunities. In addition, the time necessary for 
the development of regulatory experience and institutions as well as training human 
resources skills strengthen the case for a gradual approach to reform. Although, 
restructuring should be completed in a relatively short time, emergence of competition 
can take longer. A trade-off is however that existing arrangements tend to create vested 
interests and rent seeking behaviour. 
 
Stable macroeconomic conditions are crucial for securing a steady flow of foreign 
investments into the new generation capacity. While economy-wide matters are beyond 
the control of reformers, policy makers’ commitment to reform and regulators’ 
credibility through transparent and consistent practice can increase confidence among 
private investors. Also, countries should to the extent possible explore the possibilities 
for mobilizing and directing domestic capital to the sector. 
 
Benefits and costs of reform vary from country to country, the more efficient a sector is 
at the starting point, the closer the potential gains will be to increased transaction costs. 
There is considerable experience and lessons from reform to date. However, the task of 
designing well-functioning reforms for individual countries still remains work in 
progress. In the light of the problems that reforming countries have faced, questions that 
remain unanswered, and our incomplete understanding of some consequences, a gradual 
approach or delay in this may not after all be a major loss to some countries. 
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Appendix 1: Sequence of Electricity Sector Reform Measures in Selected Countries 
 
 
 
1. Argentina 
 
     1989             1992      1992         1992                   1992                   1992         1992         1992-93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Brazil 
 
     1995            1995              1995   1996      1997                           1997   1998                1999      1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Chile 
 
     1978              1981    1982          1982    1982         1982     1985     1997 
 
CNE 
 
 
 
 
4. Colombia 
 
     1994              1994    1995          1995     1995            1995               1996              1997 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporatization Electricity Law Restructuring Incentive Regulation 
(PCAP)+ rTPA 
Wholesale competition: 
Pool (SRMC) + contracts 
Privatization: 
D: 70% (‘92) 
G: 60% (‘92) 
T: 100% (‘93-
IPPs 
Electricity Law Restructuring 
(Partial) 
Privatization 
D: 70% 
Privatization 
T: 10% 
Regulator 
(ANEEL) 
Regulator 
(ENRE) 
Incentive 
Regulation 
(PCAP) + rTPA 
Privatization 
G: 30% 
Wholesale competition: 
Pool (limited volume) + 
contracts 
IPPs 
Regulator 
(Govt. agency) Corporatization
Restructuring 
(Partial) Electricity Law 
Incentive Regulation 
(Efficiency Std) + 
nTPA 
Wholesale competition  
(SRMC, G only) + 
contracts 
Privatization 
D, G, T: 90% 
IPPs 
Electricity 
Law 
Regulator 
(CREG) 
Corporatization Restructuring Incentive Regulation 
(PCAP) + rTPA 
Wholesale competition: Pool 
(bid-based) + contracts 
Privatization:  
G: 70% (‘96-’97) 
D: 50% (‘97-’98) 
T: 10% (‘98-’01) 
IPPs 
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5. Peru 
 
     1992                       1994                     1994   1995       1995   1995-99  1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Bolivia 
 
       1994                    1994               1995  1995                         1995     1995                 1996       1996-97   2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. El Salvador 
 
    1994-95           1996  1997      1997   1998         1998          1998-99     1998-99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Panama 
 
        1996           1997             1998    1998           1998          1998        1998         1998   2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electricity Law Regulator                    
Tariff Commission (’94) 
OSINERG (’97)  
(Govt. agencies) 
Restructuring Incentive Regulation 
(Efficiency Std.) + 
Wholesale competition 
(SRMC, G only) + 
contracts 
Privatization: 
D: 80% (’95) 
G: 60% (’95) 
T: 20% (’99) 
IPPs 
Electricity 
Law 
Corporatization Restructuring Regulator Incentive Regulation 
(PCAP/T, Efficiency 
Std/D) + rTPA 
Wholesale competition 
Spot (SRMC) + 
contracts 
Capitalization: 
G: 90%  
Capitalization: 
D: 90% (’96) 
T: 90% (’97) 
IPPs 
IPPs  
(Pre-Reform) 
Electricity 
Law 
Regulator 
(SIGET) 
Restructuring 
(G, T, D, S) 
Incentive Regulation 
(PCAP/T, Efficiency 
Std/D) + rTPA 
Wholesale/Retail 
competition 
Spot (SRMC) + 
unregulated 
contracts 
Privatization: 
D: 100% (’98) 
G: 40% (’99)  
Corporatization 
Regulator 
(ERSP) 
Electricity 
Law 
Corporatization Restructuring ROR/Cost of Service 
Regulation + rTPA 
(nTPA out of the 
central system) 
Privatization 
D: majority private 
G: majority private 
Market: Contracts 
+ spot (SRMC) 
(Single Buyer, T) 
Wholesale 
competition 
(Competitive 
bids, G, D) 
IPPs 
short
-term 
PPAs 
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9. Jamaica 
 
        1966             1995              1995                      1995          1995           2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Hungary 
 
        1992  1992        1994             1995  1995-96               1997           2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Poland 
 
       1990   1990       1997            1997  1998             1999      2000                  2000           2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Czech Republic 
 
        1992                 1992-94      1998    1999           2000    2000         2001             2001 
 
 
 
 
Corporatization Restructuring 
(G, T, D) 
Regulator 
(HEO) 
Electricity Law Privatization: 
D: 100% 
G: ~50% 
Incentive Regulation 
PCAP T/D 
No TPA till 2002 
IPPs 
(T single buyer) 
Corporatization Restructuring 
(G, T, D) 
Energy Law Regulator 
(ERA) 
Privatization 
(G partial) 
Incentive Regulation 
PCAP T/D 
nTPA 
Wholesale 
competition 
Spot + 
balancing + 
contracts 
IPPs Privatization 
(D partial) 
Corporatizatio
n 
IPPs Privatization  
G: vouchers  
20% majority 
private 
Restructuring 
(G, T, D) 
Electricity Law Regulator 
(Energy Regulatory 
Privatization  
G: partial, 30%  
majority private 
D: partial, 82.6%  
majority private 
Incentive Regulation 
PCAP T/D  
rTPA 
Corporatization Electricity 
Law 
Regulator 
(OUR) 
IPPs 
PPAs with JPSCo 
ROR/Cost of Service  
Regulation T/D  
Access: Single buyer 
Privatization 
JPSCo (VIU): 80% 
to Mirant Corp. 
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13. Orissa (India) 
 
        1995  1995        1995                 1996                1996   1998-99             2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Pakistan 
 
          1996-97           1997       1997       1997               2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Morocco 
 
            1994               1994   2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16. China 
 
          1987                              1993           1993-94     1996      1996                              1997       1997   1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporatization Electricity 
Law 
Restructuring 
(G, T, D) 
Regulator 
(Electricity Regulatory 
ROR/Cost of Service  
Regulation T/D  
Access: Single buyer 
Privatization  
G: partial 
D: partial, 51%  
(3/4 Discos to 1 
company, 4th to company 
with G interests) 
IPPs 
(PPAs) 
IPPs 
(negotiated 
Electricity Law Regulator 
(NEPRA) 
ROR/Cost of Service 
Regulation T/D  
Access: Single buyer 
Restructuring 
(starting G, T/D, WAPDA) 
Electricity Law 
(private entry 
/concessions) 
IPPs 
(negotiated 
ROR/Cost of Service 
Regulation T/D  
Access: Single buyer 
Companies 
Law 
(foreign 
ownership, 
 joint 
First IPO 
Shenzhen 
Energy, HIPDC 
Electricity 
Law 
Regulator 
(State Economic 
& Trade 
Commission) 
IPPs 
Joint Ventures 
( Shajiao, BOT 
project) 
Corporatization 
(State power 
corporation) 
IPPs 
(competitive bids/ 
Laibin B project) 
Cost Plus 
Regulation   
annual 
revisions 
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17. Thailand 
 
              1992   1992           1992       1995               1996     1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18. Malaysia 
 
           1990           1990     1990      1992                    1995              1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. Philippines 
 
           1960   1987               1990                     1993      1999          2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. Indonesia 
 
     1992    1994   1996-97    2003 
 
 
 
 
Electricity Law 
(private 
participation /NEPO 
act) 
Regulator 
(Govt. agency) 
Corporatization 
(EGCO) 
Privatization  
G: 8% of total MW 
(EGCO, ’95 & ’98) 
IPPs 
(PPAs) 
ROR/Cost of Service 
Regulation     
Access: Single buyer 
Electricity Law 
(Elec. supply 
act) 
Regulator 
(Govt. agency) 
Corporatization 
(TNB) 
Privatization  
(25% stock-float, TNB 
integrated utility) 
IPPs 
(PPAs) 
Restructuring 
(G, T, D) 
Regulator  
(ERB, Govt. agency) 
BOT Law Corporatization 
(Napocor) 
IPPs 
(negotiated PPAs) 
Access: Single buyer NPC 
(G/T), ROR regulation 
IPPs 
(negotiated PPAs) 
Sales to Meralco (D) + 
NPC (G/T) 
Electricity Law 
(ESI reform act) 
Presidential decree 
(private participation in G) Regulator  (Govt. agency) 
Corporatization 
(PLN) 
IPPs 
(negotiated 
Restructuring (G, T, D) 
Privatization (PLN) 
